One of the thoughts that have been swirling around in my head recently is that we as a society - in spite of our best intentions - are undermining efforts to build resiliency. 

How you ask? 

This happens in many ways - but the key point that occurred to me, and the point I wish to raise  here concerns how we, in effect, are softening our citizens through a process of ever increasing their expectations by providing a higher and higher level of response and recovery.  Increasingly, the expectation is that whenever there may be a problem, someone will be there to help: a first responder, an agency, a government.

So the question is, in raising expectations in this way, are we helping or hurting?

Consider one of the conclusions contained within a disaster vulnerability and capacity study conducted by the Red Cross in Zambia:

"The study also revealed that local communities have capacities, which could be harnessed to mitigate disasters, but despite all the capacities identified in the various communities, very few people sustain themselves through these capacities and resources. It was observed that the communities generally have no perception on how these capacities could be significantly utilised by themselves in mitigating disasters. They are so used to receiving relief assistance that now there is a noticeable dependency on external assistance, which has destroyed community initiatives and is affecting developmental programmes."

(Zambia Red Cross Society, "Vulnerability Capacity Assessment: Sinazongwe District, Zambia". Lusaka: Zambia Red Cross Society (ZRCS), 2003.)

If I may paraphrase for emphasis: the inhabitants can no longer protect themselves as they have become to dependant on other agencies' help.

We use the analogy of a rubber band to describe resilience, but we're missing a big piece.  Resiliency is as much a state of mind or psychological trait as a physical characteristic.

We talk about the ability to 'cope' with a disaster but don't understand how this mental concept connects with physical disaster response. 

We also talk about 'adapting to change' but again do not consider this biological trait translates to mitigation, response and recovery. 

Resilience to many is building stronger infrastructure, erecting higher fences, providing quicker response and creating better firepower.

Now, consider this definition of resilience:

"The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures."

(UN/ISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction) (2004): Living with Risk. A global review of disaster reduction initiatives. 2004 version.  United Nations, Geneva)

I guess what I'm saying in all of this can be boiled down to this familiar adage:

Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime

or changed for the sake of my argument:

Give a society the perfect response and they will survive the currednt disaster, but give them perfect resiliency and they have a better chance of  surviving any disaster, anytime.

How to frame it?

I was at a workshop last week concerning methods to ensure that the elements of critical infrastructure along the Niagara Frontier continue to operate despite significant negative impacts and, should they fail, are brought back to pre-impact operational levels as quickly and efficiently as possible.  Is this protection?  Or is it resilience?

There is a lot of evidence that our cognitive processes are greatly influenced by our language and the words we use.  To me this was highlighted as I listened to people speak of CI "protection" where I use the term CI "resilience".  We were supposed to be talking about the same thing, but it was evident that the two sides had different mental pictures of what this means.

Protection in this sense means to defend against attack and is reflected in the introduction to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP):

Members of the workshop regularly used words such as "attacks", "defense" and "terrorism".  Without, I might add, reference to any other threat that our CI might face.

Contrast the NIPP definition for protection above against the definition for resilience by Walker, et al, as found in the USAID supported document entitled How Resilient Is Your Coastal Community? A Guide for Evaluating Coastal Community Resilience to Tsunamis and Other Hazards: 

"The capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and re-organize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedback." 

Protection is only a part of resilience.  Protection makes me think of attack and defend - of physical mitigation techniques.  Resilience makes me think of elasticity, innovative use of resources, non-helplessness.  Protection makes me want to find a strong body to hide behind.  Resilience makes me want to lend a hand.  Protection is the 'gates, guns, guards' approach.  Resilience is a network of capacities and capabilities.  Protection is risk-specific.  Resilience is all-hazards.

Resilience has as much to do with people, society and psychology as it does with structures, finances and caches.  As the guide says: "Common characteristics of resilient systems include redundancy, diversity, efficiency, autonomy, strength, interdependence, adaptability, and collaboration."

That is not to say that protection from attack is unnecessary, or a wasted effort.  It is not. But it is only a piece that contributes to overall resiliency. And to focus solely on protection is to risk failure by other means, to ignore capabilities that may otherwise exist and to render useless one of our greatest resources: people, ordinary, run-of-the-mill people.

One of the more difficult tasks in developing a critical infrastructure protection / assurance program is selling the benefits to those who may not be educated in the area, but control the funds (or support) required to implement it.  This challenge has increased dramatically during these last few months of economic free-fall.

To some of us, the benefits are intuitive and lie largely on what has been avoided.  Like the old safety adage says, you never know the accident you have prevented.  That's not entirely true for CI protection or emergency management.

If you suffer a large crisis event, it is readily apparent what might the costs might have been if certain measures hadn't been taken prior.  Your Return On Investment - ROI - becomes obvious.  Unfortunately, you have to suffer the event in order to realize the results.
Nearly as good (or bad) is to be witness to a nearby crisis event much like watching a neighbor's house burn and thanking your lucky stars that you have fire insurance, "what if that was me?"  You really haven't proven or realized your ROI, but the reality has come perceptively closer.

In both the above cases, you (or someone close to you) has to suffer some catastrophic event for the value of the protection program to be seen.  However, we also know that if we gamble, and get impacted before putting a program in place... well it's too late.  No investment, no return, only loss. 

Unfortunately, it is too easy to explain away, or hide from, or ignore the risks and threats that face us.  So the task is how to sell the program to those-who-decide or those-who-fund without having to face a disaster?

I remember back to my days of high school algebra and the proofs we had to develop.  You have to remember this: if it is true for 'N' and it is true for 'N+1', then it must be true for all 'N' (induction).  Can I apply this to an argument for CI protection?  I think I can.

What, then, is 'N'?  If we consider the simplest of events, or at least one with less than catastrophic impacts, say localized flooding around a swollen creek.  You can then run a quick analysis of either the cost saved by the application of a mitigation technique (ROI = potential damage - cost of program) or the cost of the damage less the cost of the technique (negative ROI, or lost potential).  Many examples of the simple events can be found and should be chosen for the applicability to your jurisdiction, or company.

N+1?  Ratchet up the event, find a slightly more complex example. It should be a natural extension of the 'N' example.  In this case, perhaps the flood rather than from mere intensive rainfall, involves a small failure of the flood control program based on a readily available mitigation program - either implemented or not.  Run the same sort of ROI analysis as above.  Now you have your N+1.

This obviously isn't algebra and I wouldn't expect executives to roll over on just two small samples.  However, displaying an increasing upward trend, either ROI or cost of impact, against readily applicable events (or doable mitigation techniques) may serve to bring home the realities we face and dispel the "wont happen to us" mentality.

Always the third Wednesday in November.  This year it was November 19.  What!?  Haven't heard of it?  Well, let me tell you...  better yet, let them say it:

"GIS Day provides an international forum for users of geographic information systems (GIS) technology to demonstrate real-world applications that are making a difference in our society. More than 80 countries will participate in holding local events such as corporate open houses, hands-on workshops, community expos, school assemblies, and more."

This quote comes from the GIS Day website.  It says so much, but also so little therefore let me elaborate.

I'm lucky.  My city is lucky.  We have a very robust GIS capability, staffed with personnel who are actively engaged in many, if not most, divisions and departments across the city.  I'm lucky because they think emergency management is interesting and something worth dedicating dear resources to.

To me, GIS is invaluable for plume and spill modelling, flood prediction, evacuation planning and infrastructure mapping (among many applications).  It is my dream to have all elements of society, industry, resources, infrastructure, weather, etc. within our GIS datasets for developing response parameters and, more importantly, developing better response plans, highlighting vulnerabilities and analyzing interdependencies.

Our GIS staff is one of the first operational functions to be called out during an EOC activation and one of the first tools I think of when developing planning projects.  They will become more invaluable as infrastructure issues gain more of the spotlight.

Here are some examples of GIS at work in response and protection:

On Emergency Management: www.esri.com/library/whitepapers/pdfs/emermgmt.pdf

On Critical Infrastructure Protection: www.ncgia.ucsb.edu/ncrst/research/cip/CIPAgenda.pdf

On Building Municipal Resilience: www.usehazus.com/vahug/docs/hampton_roads_va.pdf

And these, from one of Hamilton's GIS experts (found on Geoplace.com):

• Checklist 911: A Critical GIS Checklist Readies Public-Safety Officials
• Deployable GIS: At the Ready for First Responders

So thank your local GIS staffers (or go and introduce yourself) and have a Happy GIS Day!

The "Critical Infrastructure Partnership Strategic Assessment Study" is a state-of-the-union type report by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) on where the Public / Private partnership on critical infrastructure protection is and what the priorities are for the incoming administration.

First and foremost though, is a description of the partnership itself.  The NIAC membership reads like a who's who of the executive level of the biggest business and industry.  The Advisory Council helps to overlook the working groups (more councils) belonging to the 16 (national) critical infrastructure sectors.  This all comes as a result of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) which creates the "the unifying structure for the integration of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) protection into a single national program. The NIPP provides an overall framework for programs and activities that are currently underway in the various sectors, as well as new and developing CI/KR protection efforts.

This collaborative effort... "will result in the prioritization of protection initiatives and investments across sectors. It also will ensure that resources are applied where they offer the most benefit for mitigating risk by lowering vulnerabilities, deterring threats, and minimizing the consequences of terrorist attacks and other incidents".  This is really good stuff, but this short description does not do justice to the magnitude of the project.  I should note that this is a U.S. federal program and similar programs have been, or are being, developed across the globe, including Canada and the Province of Ontario (that I have written about previously).

Although I would like to talk to all of the 24 page PowerPoint summary, that may get a bit tedious.  You can download it yourself here. Instead, I will pull out a few gems for discussion.

"Regulation cannot achieve the same level of infrastructure protection success as the partnership". Emergency Management Ontario has recently launched the Supply Chain Alliance program, where the private sector was invited to create an emergency supply chain system for the province during a provincial emergency.  As an invitation, not legislated requirement, the program showed unprecedented private sector participation, cooperation and speed of implementation.

"A strong value proposition must be articulated and reaffirmed to sustain private sector participation in the partnership".  This is certainly a sentiment that needs re-iteration: private sector businesses are NOT altruistic entities, they must profit to survive.  Though profit can be derived from many sources: advertising / marketing, good "PR", exclusivity, etc.  To the public sector preferring 'value' can be a creative (and rewarding) process.

"There continues to be an imbalance between the resources available to support the current requirements of the sector partnership model and the demands placed on it."  Let's face it, we have many complex systems most work well, but not flawlessly.  In order to even approach a high degree of resilience will take a long time and much resources.  What is the alternative?  That the sum of the parts (costs, fees, breakdowns, higher prices, shifting responsibilities, etc.) will indeed be greater than the whole.

The study illuminates us on what we have always suspected about government bodies: "Productive partnership efforts can get bogged down by inefficient government processes and cumbersome requirements", "Better coordination among government entities will strengthen the partnership", "A lack of partnership experience and skills hinders collaboration."  Need I say more?  But before you government sector folks get offended, remember I'm one too.

Lastly, this quote on recommendations for the new administration, is one I like best, to "reaffirm the importance of critical  infrastructure protection and resilience as a fundamental mission of government and a responsibility of business".  Note that  these are parallel, but not the same.  A "mission" of government, but a "responsibility" of business.  This theme is endorsed by business through the Council.  Two different agendas, one common outcome: resilience.

I wrote recently on 'educating the decision makers' -- essentially on the need to have the elected officials and executive administration properly educated on issues of wide ranging impacts and consequences in order that truly informed decisions can be made. I can now add a further dimension to this subject.

Yesterday I, along with a colleague, presented at a seminar on the need for field level adaptation programs to lessen the impacts of climate change.  The organizers were the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing and the Association of Municipalities of Ontario.  The audience consisted of both administrators and elected officials.

From the feedback I received (granted it was a small sample size), I realized that there is a distinct lack of awareness of the obstacles, challenges and blockages of information running up to the decision makers.  Simply put, the elected officials I spoke with were surprised that I (or my colleagues) could not walk into their offices and speak to issues.  And while they mentioned various mechanisms for educating their bodies, were not aware of the pathways and challenges of stickhandling such a proposal through to them.

In fact, although it made sense to these officials, they did not realize that in many instances, the attempt to get information directly to them, contentious or cooperative, sensitive or secure, exciting or banal, may be a "Career Limiting Move," or even grounds for dismissal.

So how does one get information to those that need to decide, undiluted and in a timely fashion, without breaking chain of command?

The only answer I have is that the search for information and the satisfaction (or not) of the reply has to come from the highest levels.  There should be an assumption that not all information is bubbling up, that not all issues are laid on the table and that expediency is maintained in flowing through what is currently in the pipeline.

I realize that not all organizations have the same challenges and some excel better than others at information flow. But I would wager that everyone can admit the possibility of some facets of the above challenges in their organization.

In short, I believe that many senior officials need to have a greater finger on the pulse of the organization (without micro managing), or as the responders put it, a greater situational awareness to determine information gaps and needs and thus make more informed decisions.

Our governments, big business and other organisations are highly stratified.  We all know this.  The closer we are to the bottom of the ladder, the more we do.  The higher we are to the top, the more we decide what is to be done.  Again, pretty obvious.

There are many benefits to this system.  One being we don't have inexperienced, 'wet behind the ears' employees making critical decisions and running the business.  On the other hand, our decision makers get further and further away from the field. Basing decisions on increasingly outdated and obsolete ground level experience.  Funny though, that's not my point.

What is my point is that at the very highest levels, in the largest of companies / governments the decision makers are only just that.  They decide.  They rarely have time to digest information.  They rarely have time to educate themselves.  They rely on an upward trend of recommendations through reporting structures and advisors to provide for them the sound bite of information required to make the decision:  "Just give me the 50,000 foot overview (as we walk between meetings)". Maybe this is necessary.  Maybe this is the best way.  But maybe it has it's faults.

My area of focus, emergency management, often has CORPORATE WIDE IMPLICATIONS and employs a complex stream of analyses, justifications and diverse perspectives to paint a realistic view of risk to those who must responsibly treat these risks or give direction to treat these risks.  Can your executive adequately make decisions on Critical Infrastructure Assurance, Continuity of Operations or Comprehensive Terrorist Threat Assessment Programs based on a one or two page brief?  

The question is: how does one prepare the decision makers to make an informed decision, when there is little time or ability to properly educate them? 

Further, if an incorrect decision is made, who is most at fault?  Those that didn't (couldn't) supply the correct amount of information / awareness / education? Or those that didn't (couldn't) devote the time for the correct amount of  information / awareness / education?  How can we get the an increasing amount of 'face time' with the executive to ensure they the essential information required to make the informed decisions on these comprehensive programs?

I hear this phrase now at almost every other conference, workshop or seminar I attend on the subject of emergency management.  It is a plea of the moderator for the audience to get out and meet the other attendees.  "NOW is the time to exchange business cards", they say.  "Well that's just great", I say.  But there are problems with this.

Firstly, I now have a drawer full of business cards.  We live in an electronic information age, at least I do.  It's better to send an email so I can electronically catalogue your information, place into my contacts folder and blast you an email from time to time.  It's much easier as I have a genetic disposition for instantly forgetting names. But that's not the problem, that's just me.

The problem is that we are connecting ourselves through chance meetings at various events, meeting those of the same interest and the same abilities to attend.  It's a skewed audience.  I will have to hope that in the midst of an emergency, I have previously met the person I now desperately need to contact.

Our contacts are based on personal relationships, chance meetings and imperfect memberships.  How many meetings have you attended where some (many) of the members are no-shows, or send a 'designate'?  This problem looms large for the emergency manager, or anyone who needs to coordinate vast and varied persons / organizations / industries and needs them to 'play nicely together in the sandbox'.

What still has to occur in emergency management, risk management, business continuity and any other discipline that stretches across an organization or public body is to operationalize the process.  That is to pull the function away from the individual (the 'champion') and push it to the position, connecting with every other position.

We shouldn't need to exchange business cards.  We should have to rely on happenstance to meet the right people.  We should have the networks set out in all of our operations so contacts are known, exercised and maintained.  So if so-and-so from such-and-such retires, I would know immediately, would know his/her replacement and would not lose continuity.

Imagine during an emergency I pull out a business card and "...the number you have dialled is no longer in service..."

It's interesting in itself that the OHA had partnered with the Toronto Board of Trade, the Disaster Recovery Information Exchange (DRIE), the Ontario Association of Emergency Managers (OAEM) among others to host this event in their "Business of Health" series. 

I worked with the organizers of the conference to set it up and immediately one problem came to the fore: price.  In hindsight, as I watched the day progress it seemed this issue underscores one of the problems of engaging both sectors at the same time.  On the surface, the problem was that (in general terms) a municipal employee tends to be adverse to spending high dollars to attend conferences, workshops, etc. (or has to go through hoops, has limits, must apply months in advance, etc), whereas many in the private sector do not have these same controls or limits.  Further, many in the private sector will not attend a low cost event under the impression that low cost = low value.

The deeper problem is the entirely different way these two sectors view spending money, investment in people and projects, bottom line results, etc.  My own perspective is that private companies are more inclined to invest money into projects that ultimately improve their bottom line, whether directly through profits, or indirectly through improved customer satisfaction, greater competitive advantage, etc.  In the public sector, the improved 'bottom line' is only one of many considerations, along with perception of 'good fiscal management' (ie don't raise taxes), the 'need to succeed' (most of our work reflects well or poorly on someone else), timing (elections, budgets, re-orgs, etc.) and other non-monetary, barely tangible issues.  I know this is a crass oversimplification, but you get the point: these are two widely separate systems.

Pricing was our dilemma for this past event.  In the end, the initial price was dropped to be inclusive of the public sector, but not so much that it "cheapened" the day.  The mix of sectors was good, but the overall attendance was not as high as desired.  We are left wondering whether there can be a price point that is low enough for the public sector, yet high enough for the private sector and still (at least) break even.

And that's just the obvious.  Note the impact this would have on our: hydro rates, telephone bills, water bills, natural gas bills and tax rates (don't forget the parks path!).

What about the not-so-obvious? Lost business with downed telephone service, wasted (thawed) frozen food, possible potable water contamination, lost productivity due to an increase in commuting time... oh, and a lesser quality of life because the park cannot be accessed.

These are the real costs of disasters.  They are mostly hidden.  They are mostly borne by the municipality or the private sector.  Where do they recover their costs from?  I think we all know the answer to that.

An aside:  There's a couple of significant things happening in Canada that are relevant to this blog. 

First, a new report has been released by a Standing Committee of our Senate (basically the place where our politicians go to retire) entitled:

"Emergency Preparedness In Canada... Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence".  The reason for the elipses points is for the subtitle of the report:

"How the fine arts of bafflegab and procrastination hobble the people who will be trying to save you when things get really bad..."

I kid you not... actually, it's as entertaining a read as a Senate Report can be.

The other significant event is a Canadian federal election that was just called by our prime minister.  I wont even make fun of it (yet), however I will say the municipalities (especially in Ontario) are ramping up to make infrastructure, critical infrastructure and lack of funding for such big political issues for the election.

More on these to come...

There are a few factors to consider that make this torrential downpour a potential disaster.  The water treatment plant destined to have problems on the 1st services approximately 380,000 people.  Over 600 km of the city's pipelines (370+ miles) are combined sewers, both sewage and runoff into the same pipes.  With an average temperature hovering just above freezing, there is little evaporation.  Torrential downpours often result in immediate runoff (into sewers) because the ground does not have the time to absorb the rainfall.

To make a long story shorter, the treatment plant had an increasing wall of dirty water bearing down on it, filling it's holding tanks and maxing out their outfall and diversion structures and still the wet water well was increasing in height, threatening to breach the upper limit.  As the water level approached the limit, the height differential between the well and several dozen residential basements starts to become equal. 

If this could be worse, it was.  If the water was to breach the top of the well, it would flow into the dry well area of the plant.  This is the location of the pumps and (of course) all of the electrical equipment servicing the pumps.  If the electrical shorts, the equipment fails, the waters rise uncontrollably and a significant portion of the lower city becomes flooded with dirty water.  A public works, public health, civic disaster.

If it had happened, you would likely have known as it would have made BIG news in North America.  The treatment plant had 5 wet well pumps and 3 dry well sump pumps fully operating before a fix was found.  There was one sump pump left.

So... an isolated incident?  An unfortunate synergy of circumstances?  A product of aging infrastructure?  Poor planning from decades past?  Does the cause matter?  The fact remains that many cities worldwide still have a significant percentage of combined sewerage.  That funding for municipal infrastructure is not keeping up with maintenance in many cases.  That science is telling us that global warming will give many of us an increase in torrential rainfalls.

While the incident may be isolated from a historical perspective, it is quite likely a harbinger of things to come.

PS:  it is heartening to know that the 'fix' found was reportedly offered up by a couple of old timers in public works who pointed out a little known, unused gate in the system.  "Institutional memory" saved the city.  A different lesson for another day.

...this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.

                     - November 10, 1942

This is my hope when it comes to global warming ("climate change") and how we as a people, a society, an administration are dealing with it.  Each piece of the above quote is apt in this context.

The end? Some doomsayers will have you believe that the effects of global warming will indeed spell "the end".  I don't.  Nor do I believe it is the beginning of the end.  I don't think humanity will let it get that far.  Therefore, it is not the beginning of the end.

However, after 30 or 40 years of science, observations, propaganda and politics, I hope it is the end of the beginning.  The end of talk.  The end of argument.  The end of inaction.  All of this (I hope) was the beginning.

This blog is being written to help us move to the next step: action.  Action in terms of planning, prevention, mitigation and adaptation.  PROactive words. As an emergency manager, a member of society, a father... I believe we must all now work toward solutions, provide answers, take action.

Waiting for it (reaction) will no longer suffice if we truly do not want this to be "the end".  What I believe is also obvious, is that solutions will only come through a collective, multidisciplinary, respectful effort.  The complexities, responsibilities and interdependencies are too great and varied to rest with one individual, one group, one industry.

These (and others) are the concepts I will be addressing in my blogs to come...

I am one of two Emergency Management Coordinators for the City of Hamilton, Canada and Hamilton's designated Community Emergency Management Coordinator (CEMC).  Hamilton is located in Ontario, at the Southeast corner of Lake Ontario about an hour's drive from Toronto (3 hrs. during the rush).  The CEMC designation denotes that I am the first one that Emergency Management Ontario calls in a disaster.  The CEMC is a legislated position for each of the 450+ municipalities in Ontario under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act and its regulations.  I have been with Hamilton since October, 2004.

I am also the President of the Ontario Association of Emergency Managers previously serving as Vice President as well as Secretary to the Board and several other functions.  The OAEM has approximately 500 members comprising of emergency managers from both the public and private sectors. 

I sit as the OAEM Representative to the Continuity of Government Sector Working Group of the Ontario Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program.  The OCIAP has 9 working groups representing the obvious critical sectors of society (public safety, gas, hydro, public health, water, food, etc.). Our group has recently published a 'toolkit' for ensuring the continuity of decision making during a crisis.  I have uploaded the document for your use.

I like to be involved in the profession.  Among some of my recent and current activities: at various times over the past six years -  member of the Program Selection Committee, Professional Recognition Award Committee and Volunteer Coordinator for the World Conference on Disaster Management, undertaking projects with the Canadian Centre for Emergency Preparedness and as an instructor for the Emergency Management Certificate Program at Centennial College in Toronto, teaching risk assessment and hazard analysis.

My actual schooling is in Environmental Studies, with a degree in Urban and Regional Planning from the University of Waterloo and I have also attained the Associate Business Continuity Professional designation from the Disaster Recovery Institute.

Hamilton has had its share of crises including: a tornado touchdown in November, 2005; an ambulance shortage in May, 2006 and excessive storm water surge in December, 2006.  I have helped to maintain 4 different Emergency Operations Centres and undertaking a study for a fifth.

That's a synopsis - I've done other things (spent 10 years in software development, worked for a while in a meat packing plant, cooked in restaurants, clubs and golf clubs) - but we don't have to go into that...

You can reach me at richard.kinchlea@hamilton.ca.